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Memory researchers have increasingly become inter-
ested in the time course of recognition memory—that is,
how recognition judgments are created over time. Collect-
ing data over the course of the creation of a recognition
judgment should provide a detailed picture of recognition
that is especially informative for developing models of
recognition memory, going beyond data that simply reflect
the end point of the judgment process. Relatedly, time course
data should be especially useful for addressing such ques-
tions as whether there are multiple processes involved in
recognition memory (e.g., Brockdorff & Lamberts, 2000;
Rotello & Heit, 1999) and whether different sources of in-
formation are available at different times (e.g., Dosher &
Rosedale, 1991).
One technique for looking at the time course of recog-
nition is to measure event-related potentials (ERPs), elec-
tromagnetic signals in the brain at different intervals after
a stimulus presentation (e.g., Curran, 2000). However, it is
also possible to look at the time course of recognition with
behavioral measures alone, using the response signal tech-
nique (introduced by Reed, 1973). With this technique, the
participant is interrupted at various points in time while
making a recognition judgment. The participant is instructed
to respond quickly after the interrupting signal (e.g., a tone),
making a judgment on the basis of whatever assessment
has been completed up to that point. The response signal
comes at some point from, say, 100 to 1,500 msec from stim-
ulus onset, determined randomly for each judgment trial.
With the response signal technique, a number of inter-
esting results in recognition memory have been obtained.
For example, Dosher and Rosedale (1991), looking at
memory for word pairs, found that retrieving episodic in-
formation (whether the words had been studied together)
had a different time course than did retrieving semantic in-
formation (whether the words were related). This tech-
nique has also been applied to comparisons of the time
course of recognition versus lexical decision (Hintzman &
Curran, 1997), recognition versus modality judgment (Hintz-
man & Caulton, 1997; McElree, Dolan, & Jacoby, 1999),
item recognition versus associative recognition (Gronlund
& Ratcliff, 1989; Ratcliff & McKoon, 1989), and item
recognition versus list discrimination (Hintzman, Caulton,
& Levitin, 1998; Rotello & Heit, 2000). 
Taken together, experiments with the response signal
technique have used a variety of statistical measures of
recognition memory performance. Virtually all the exper-
iments have reported a combination of raw scores (hit rates
and false alarms) and derived scores (such as d ¢). In gen-
eral, we support the idea of using multiple measures of
performance, targeting different aspects of the data and
giving a full picture of the results. 
However, different measures of performance may give
conflicting results. In experiments on word recognition
memory, Hintzman and Curran (1994) reported a striking
nonmonotonic pattern of results for foil test stimuli that
were similar to old training items—for example, for FROGS
when FROG had been studied. The false alarm rate on these
foil items rose up to around 700 msec, then fell with addi-
tional processing time. This pattern was interpreted in
terms of a second, slower process having an effect on recog-
nition later in processing, helping people to reject similar
foils. However, Rotello and Heit (1999) reanalyzed these
data, using derived scores (specifically dL, the logistic ver-
sion of d ¢), and found that the pattern of performance for
similar foils was a monotonic rise to an asymptote, rather
than being “peaked.” This dissociation between raw scores
and derived measures can also go the opposite way. In an
This research was supported by a grant from the Biotechnology and
Biological Sciences Research Council of the United Kingdom.  Part of
this research was presented at the 2000 Annual Meeting of the Psycho-
nomic Society, New Orleans. Please address correspondence to E. Heit,
Department of Psychology, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL,
England (e-mail: e.heit@warwick.ac.uk).
Adaptive changes of response criterion 
in recognition memory
EVAN HEIT, NOELLIE BROCKDORFF, and KOEN LAMBERTS
University of Warwick, Coventry, England
An experiment was conducted to investigate people’s ability to vary a response criterion strategically,
in a recognition memory task, as a function of the length of time given to process the test stimuli (from
100 to 1,500 msec). The experiment used the response signal procedure, in which the participants re-
sponded after a signal that came at a variable time delay from stimulus onset. The proportion of new ver-
sus old test items was varied systematically with the time of the response signal, with the proportion
of new test items rising, falling, or staying constant at later signals. It was found that the participants’
response biases changed adaptively, becoming more conservative at later signals in the rising condition,
becoming less conservative in the falling condition, and not changing significantly in the constant con-
dition. Theoretical and methodological implications for recognition memory research are discussed.
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review
2003, 10 (3), 718-723
ADAPTIVE CHANGES OF RESPONSE CRITERION 719
experiment on list-specific recognition memory for
words, Rotello and Heit (2000, Experiment 3) found that
raw scores reached an asymptote, then stayed flat, but that
derived scores showed a peaked pattern. Therefore, it does
seem important to consider multiple measures of perfor-
mance, in case different measures might suggest different
conclusions. 
In addition, there is potentially a problem in using raw
scores, particularly with the response signal technique. It
is widely accepted that raw scores, such as hit rate and
false alarm rate, reflect a mixture of response to the stim-
ulus itself, as well as guessing or other response biases (e.g.,
Macmillan & Creelman, 1991). The conventional way to
overcome the problem of raw scores is to use derived mea-
sures, such as d ¢, that are meant to correct for possibly
varying response bias. If participants in a response signal
experiment have different response criteria at different
points in time, looking at raw scores could be rather mis-
leading. For example, if participants have an overall ten-
dency to respond new at early test signals and to respond
old at later test signals, it would be difficult to compare,
say, a false alarm rate of 60% at 100 msec with a false
alarm rate of 40% at 1,500 msec. 
Before describing some results that address whether re-
sponse criteria vary in response signal experiments, we
present two intuitive arguments. On the one side, one might
argue that because the response signal task moves so
quickly, interrupting participants at random, unpredictable
times, it is implausible that participants could strategically
vary their response criteria. The argument is that partici-
pants cannot choose to have different criteria for different
stimuli; instead, response criterion is an overall character-
istic of performance in a recognition experiment. On the
other side, the argument would be that responding at early
and at late signals are, in effect, very different tasks. Mak-
ing a recognition judgment after 100 msec is so different
from making a recognition judgment after 1,500 msec that
it is plausible that different criteria would be in effect. An-
other way to put this argument is that with five to eight
different response signals between 100 and 1,500 msec, it
would be difficult for participants to maintain the same
response criteria for different time signals. Next, we will
turn to past results.
Hintzman, Caulton, and Curran (1994) reported three
word recognition memory experiments that used the re-
sponse signal method. For all three experiments, analyses
of variance (ANOVAs) did not show significant changes
in response bias (using cL, the logistic equivalent of the c
measure of bias) as a function of time. The graphs of the
data showed a rather flat average cL, not varying for dif-
ferent response signals. At first inspection, there was not
much evidence for a changing response bias. However,
Hintzman et al. (1994) noted the high variability of their
cL measures. This variability could reduce the power to
detect a small change in criterion. Also, the pattern of data
was consistent with individual participants varying their
biases as a function of time, but with different participants
adopting different strategies over time. (Indeed, Hintzman
et al., 1994, reported that individual participants’ response
biases were correlated from one response signal to an-
other, fitting the idea that there were systematic individ-
ual differences.) In sum, Hintzman et al.’s (1994) results
do not point directly to changes in criteria, but as null re-
sults, they do not rule this out, either.
Rotello and Heit (1999) briefly described (footnote 8)
several analyses of response bias; they reported some sig-
nificant changes in response bias for their own experi-
ments and those of Hintzman and Curran (1994). The gen-
eral finding in Rotello and Heit’s (1999) experiments was
a more conservative response bias at later time signals,
when more information would be available to the partici-
pant. Therefore, Rotello and Heit (1999) argued that for
response signal experiments, raw scores need to be inter-
preted with caution, because changes in false alarm rate
could reflect mere changes in response bias. However,
they did not provide much detail about these analyses.
Also, Rotello and Heit (1999) did not make the crucial dis-
tinction between response bias and response criterion. Ac-
cording to signal detection theory (e.g., Macmillan &
Creelman, 1991), the c measure of response bias denotes
the position of the decision criterion relative to the half-
way point between the new and the old distributions. As
has been highlighted in recent articles by Miller and Wol-
ford (1999), Wickens and Hirshman (2000), and Wixted
and Stretch (2000), it is problematic to treat c as an ab-
solute measure of response criterion when comparing re-
sults from two experimental conditions. (There are analo-
gous problems for the cL measure of bias.) If the two
experimental conditions also show different levels of sen-
sitivity (d ¢), the midpoint between distributions will be in
a different place. In response signal experiments, perfor-
mance in terms of d ¢ typically varies at different response
signals. Hence, it would not be straightforward to com-
pare measures of bias at different times, and even if a change
in bias is manifested, it might not reflect a true change in
underlying response criterion.
Rationale of Experiment
In our experiment, we created more suitable conditions
for investigating whether people can vary the response cri-
terion strategically in a response signal task. The key idea
was to manipulate the pattern of test stimuli to encourage
different patterns of response bias. Several previous stud-
ies (e.g., Estes & Maddox, 1995; Hirshman & Henzler,
1998; Ratcliff, Sheu, & Gronlund, 1992) have suggested
that, more generally in recognition experiments, response
bias is sensitive to the proportion of new versus old test
items in an adaptive manner. For example, people seem to
show a more conservative response bias when there is a
high proportion of true new items on a test list. However,
these experiments did not use the response signal tech-
nique; they focused on comparisons between groups of
participants or between lists, in which case a participant
was expected to adopt the same bias for all the items on a
test list. In our experiment, we tested different proportions
of new and old items at different time signals, so that the
720 HEIT, BROCKDORFF, AND LAMBERTS
participants might adopt different response biases at dif-
ferent time signals if they were able to do so. The config-
uration of test items was varied between groups of partic-
ipants; therefore, we expected to find systematic differences
in patterns of response bias between groups. It was also
expected that different groups of participants would be
roughly equivalent in term of sensitivity measures, so that
comparing the response bias measures between groups
would be fairly straightforward, making it easier to draw
inferences about true differences in criterion. 
We compared two main conditions in which the pro-
portion of new items tested varied as a function of process-
ing time. In the rising condition, the proportion of new items
tested was low at early response signals, but this propor-
tion increased at later signals. In the falling condition, the
proportion of new items tested was high at early response
signals, falling at later response signals. We predicted that
the participants in the two groups would show different
patterns of response bias over processing time, reflecting
different strategies based on the distribution of new and
old test items at different signals. For comparison, we also
included a third condition in which the proportion of new
test items was constant across response signals. 
Method
Participants. The paid participants were 18 students from the
University of Warwick.
Apparatus and Stimuli. The experiment was controlled by a
Pentium 400-MHz computer with a 17-in. color monitor. Responses
were registered by means of two microswitches connected to the
computer’s parallel port. 
The picture stimuli consisted of color photographs, presented in
the middle of the screen on a black background. (For other recent
experiments in which the response signal technique was used to
study picture recognition memory, see Brockdorff & Lamberts,
2000, and Lamberts, Brockdorff, & Heit, 2002.) The 360 photo-
graphs measured 9.2 3 9.2 cm, showed a wide variety of outdoor
scenes, and looked much like postcards. For each participant, the
360 stimuli were randomly assigned to six study/test blocks. Each
study list consisted of 30 experimental pictures and 6 filler pictures,
3 of which were used at the start of the list and 3 at the end of the
list, to minimize primacy and recency effects. Each test list consisted
of 60 experimental pictures, 30 old studied items and 30 new un-
studied items.
Procedure. Each participant attended one session, lasting about
70 min. Each session consisted of a practice stage and six old–new
recognition memory tests in which a response signal procedure was
used. Each memory test consisted of a study phase followed imme-
diately by a test phase.
In each study phase, all 36 pictures were presented on the com-
puter screen, 1 picture at a time, at a rate of 3 sec per picture. Imme-
diately following the study phase, a recognition test was given on
the 30 old and 30 new pictures. On each test trial, a cue (a cross) was
shown at the center of the screen for 500 msec. The screen went blank
(black) for 100 msec, and then a picture appeared. At variable time
lags after the stimulus appeared on screen (100, 250, 400, 600, 900,
or 1,500 msec), a 1000-Hz tone sounded, and the stimulus was re-
placed on screen by a mask made up of small multicolored squares.
These time lags cover the range that has typically been used in other
response signal studies of recognition. The participants were in-
structed to make a recognition judgment immediately after they
heard the tone and to respond as accurately as possible. The partic-
ipants were instructed to press the old key if the test item was one
previously seen during study and to press the new key if the item had
not been seen. The response button mappings were counterbalanced
across participants. If no response was made within 300 msec of the
onset of the tone or if a response was made before the onset of the
tone, an appropriate error message was displayed. In addition, sum-
mary feedback about accuracy and proportion within time was given
at the end of each test block.
The participants were assigned to three different conditions, with
6 participants in each condition. The study phases in the three con-
ditions were identical, but the three conditions differed in the test
phase. Each test block in all three conditions consisted of 60 trials.
In the rising condition, the ratio of new stimuli to old stimuli was
manipulated across time lags. In the two earliest time lags, the ratio
of new stimuli to old stimuli was one new to nine old; in the two
middle time lags, the ratio was five new to five old; and in the last
two time lags, the ratio was nine new to one old. In the falling con-
dition, for the two earliest time lags, the ratio of new stimuli to old
stimuli was 9 new to one old; in the two middle time lags, the ratio
was five new to five old; and in the last two time lags, the ratio was
one new to nine old. Finally, in the constant condition, equal num-
bers of pictures of each type were assigned to each response signal
condition (five new and five old in each time lag; see Table 1 for a
summary). The participants were not informed that the ratios of new
versus old test items might vary depending on the time before the re-
sponse signal.
Before the experimental blocks, the participants were given a
practice block, which was exactly like an experimental study/test block
except that the stimuli were color drawings, rather than photographs.
In the practice test phase, equal numbers of pictures of each type
(new or old) were assigned to each response signal condition. 
Results
The data were trimmed to remove responses in which
the participants either failed to respond within 350 msec
of a response signal (10%) or made anticipatory responses
earlier than 100 msec after the response signal (2%). 
The mean accuracy over all the participants on each
condition is shown in Figure 1. (Note that the x-axis reflects
time to signal plus average response time.) Accuracy is
expressed in terms of the d ¢ index of sensitivity. To avoid
undefined values of d ¢, in the computation of d ¢, the hit
rates and the false alarm rates were adjusted by adding .5
to the number of old responses and dividing by the num-
ber of responses +1 (Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988). The
clear results are that d ¢ increased over the course of judg-
ment, reaching a high level of performance, and that d ¢
did not vary as a function of condition (rising, falling, or
constant). The conclusions were supported by an ANOVA.
There was a significant main effect of time of response
signal [F(5,75)5 82.42, MSe 5 0.30, p , .001]. The ef-
fect of condition was not significant [F(2,15) 5 0.96,
MSe 5 1.41], and likewise, the interaction between con-
Table 1
Ratio of New to Old Test Stimuli Across Time Lags 
in the Three Test Conditions
Time Lag (msec)
Condition 100 250 400 600 900 1,500
Rising 1:9 1:9 5:5 5:5 9:1 9:1
Falling 9:1 9:1 5:5 5:5 1:9 1:9
Constant 5:5 5:5 5:5 5:5 5:5 5:5
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dition and response signal was not significant [F(10,75)5
1.06, MSe5 0.30]. 
For clarity, the bias results are presented separately for
the constant condition and for the two other (rising and
falling) conditions. The top panel of Figure 2 shows re-
sponse bias for the constant condition in terms of the c
measure of bias. Note that higher values of c indicate more
conservatism—that is, a greater tendency to say new
(Macmillan & Creelman, 1991, p. 33). (In the figure, error
bars show standard errors.) In an ANOVA for just the con-
stant condition, the effect of response signal time did not
reach the level of statistical significance [F(5,25)5 0.36,
MSe5 0.15]. Next, the bottom panel of Figure 2 shows re-
sponse bias for the rising and falling conditions. In the ris-
ing condition, the participants became more conservative
at later response signals as the proportion of new test items
increased. Likewise, in the falling condition, the partici-
pants became less conservative at later response signals
as the proportion of new test items decreased. Critically,
an ANOVA for these two conditions showed a significant
interaction between condition and response signal time
[F(5,50)5 11.46, MSe 5 0.10, p , .001]. There was no
significant main effect of condition [F(1,10) 5 0.00,
MSe 5 0.67] or response signal [F(5,50)5 1.33, MSe ,
0.10], however.
Finally, for completeness, in Table 2 we report the raw
hit rates and false alarm rates. Perhaps most notable is that
the false alarm rates generally decrease at later response
signals. This finding was originally taken by Rotello and
Heit (1999) to suggest changes in response bias over the
time course of making a recognition judgment. 
Discussion
The results very clearly showed that people can adjust
their response biases strategically at different time lags
when the response signal procedure is used. In the rising
condition, in which it would be adaptive to increasingly give
new responses at longer lags, to reflect the greater pro-
portion of new test items, people did become more con-
servative over time. Likewise, the participants adaptively
changed their response bias in the falling condition, re-
flecting the decreasing proportion of new items over time. 
Drawing inferences about response criterion. We
next turn to the question of whether these clear changes in
the c measure of response bias can be interpreted as truly
reflecting shifts in the underlying criterion. We note that
there was no significant main effect of condition on d ¢
and, likewise, the interaction between condition and re-
sponse signal did not have a significant effect on d ¢. Hence,
the values of d ¢ at a particular response signal should be
comparable from one condition to another. In terms of sig-
nal detection theory, the distributions of old items should
be the same in all three conditions. Thus, at any particular
response time, the response bias differences can be safely
interpreted as differences in criterion from one condition
to another. Therefore, we would conclude that the differ-
ent patterns of testing for the rising and the falling condi-
tions led to different patterns of response criterion.
Figure 1. Sensitivity (d ¢) at varying response signals.
Figure 2. Response bias (c) at varying response signals.
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A perhaps more conservative analysis would reflect that
although there were no significant effects of condition on
d ¢, the graph in Figure 1 does suggest some slight, albeit
nonsignificant, variations in d ¢ from one condition to an-
other. If these small differences were real, they could make
the c measures of bias slightly misaligned, because the
midpoint between the new and the old distributions could
differ slightly between conditions. In an attempt to address
this possibility, we used each participant’s d ¢ measure to
rescale his or her c measure, so that c was measured rela-
tive to a zero point, rather than relative to a midpoint be-
tween distributions. Using these rescaled c measures, we
were able to draw the same main conclusions. That is, at
early time signals, the participants in the falling condition
were more conservative than the participants in the rising
condition, and at later time signals, the participants in the
rising condition were more conservative than the partici-
pants in the falling condition.
Having established that response criterion truly differed
between conditions, we next turn to the question of whether
the participants truly varied their response criteria within
a condition. This is a more difficult question, because
there were substantial changes in d ¢ over the time course
of making a recognition judgment. Therefore, the c mea-
sures of bias must be interpreted with caution when one is
looking at different time lags within a condition. However,
we note that c rose over time in the rising condition and
fell over time in the falling condition. Any shifts in the dis-
tributions over time should affect the rising and falling
conditions in the same direction, so they could not explain
the different changes in the two conditions. Hence, there
must be some true shifts in the response criterion over
time in this experiment, taking the results from all the con-
ditions together. 
Conclusions. We see these results as having method-
ological as well as theoretical implications. Practically, as
was argued by Rotello and Heit (1999), when there is po-
tential for participants to vary their response criteria strate-
gically, in response signal experiments or when test lists
differ in composition, raw score measures that do not cor-
rect for response bias should be interpreted with caution.
Admittedly, most memory research already does supple-
ment raw score measures with signal detection analyses,
but these results provide an even stronger motivation, par-
ticularly for response signal experiments. In cases in
which raw scores and derived scores lead to different the-
oretical conclusions (e.g., Rotello & Heit, 1999, 2000), it
should be noted that raw scores could well be influenced
by changes in response criteria.
In theoretical terms, we note that the general debate
about whether and when people can vary response crite-
ria adaptively has implications for a number of theoretical
issues in recognition memory (e.g., Estes & Maddox,
1995; Gallo, Roediger, & McDermott, 2001; Gillund &
Shiffrin, 1984; Miller & Wolford, 1999; Rotello & Heit,
1999, 2000; Stretch & Wixted, 1998). We see our own re-
sults as documenting this ability, whereas past conclusions
have been mixed. Indeed, we see striking parallels between
our participants’ ability to learn about the recognition test
set and the phenomenon of unsupervised category learn-
ing, in which people learn about the structure of a stimu-
lus set without detailed trial-and-error feedback (for a re-
view, see Love, 2002). To give one dramatic example of
unsupervised category learning, Palmeri and Flanery (1999)
reported good performance on a multidimensional per-
ceptual categorization test by participants who had not ob-
served any training items at all, because the structure of
the stimulus set could be inferred from the test list. 
In general terms, there is a history of bringing together
models of recognition memory and categorization (e.g.,
Estes, 1994). In recent work (Brockdorff & Lamberts,
2000; Lamberts et al., 2002), we have applied an exemplar
model, originally designed for time course phenomena in
categorization, to experiments on the time course of recog-
nition memory. This model postulates a feature-sampling
process that takes place over time, so that later judgments
reflect more featural information. Generally speaking, this
model can predict changes in response bias over the time
course of making a recognition judgment. For example, the
model would account for the general trend for decreased
false alarm rates over time (see Table 2) by assuming that
with more feature information available, new test items
should be increasingly dissimilar to old, studied items.
Moreover, this model has a means for modulating re-
sponse bias, by varying the relative influences of old, stud-
ied items versus “background” memory traces from outside
of the study list. What the model still lacks is a mechanism
for learning appropriate response biases from the test list
(but see Estes & Maddox, 1995, p. 1089, for relevant sug-
gestions).
To conclude, we believe that greater attention to the
issue of changes in response criterion should have a ben-
eficial impact on future theoretical development in recog-
nition memory research. 
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